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“At the end of the day, sports are a business,” - Taylor Dent1 
Introduction 
In August 2012, the Manchester United football club offered its stock publicly on the 
New York Stock Exchange.  By most accounts in the media, it was a terrible investment.  And 
yet, eight months out from the initial offering, the MANU stock has performed tremendously, 
outperforming market benchmarks like the S&P 500 by a wide margin throughout 2013.  By 
utilizing U.S. legislation like the JOBS Act and options like the dual-class voting structure 
available in the U.S., Manchester United was able to earn over $230 million without forfeiting 
any significant control of the company.  Manchester United’s success will encourage other sports 
teams, both domestic and foreign, to go public in the U.S. as well. 
                                                 
1 Doubles Players Take ATP to Court, CANADIAN PRESS (Sept. 22, 2005),  
http://www.tsn.ca/story/print/?id=135298. 
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Only a small minority of sports teams in the United States are currently directly traded on 
a public stock market.
2
  Instead, most are owned by privately-held corporations, publicly-quoted 
corporations or unincorporated partnerships that have a few investors.
3
  At first glance, the 
difference between a publicly traded team (sometimes called a “stock market team”4) and a team 
owned by a publicly traded company may seem negligible.  After all, in both cases stock is 
traded on a public market and owned by numerous diverse investors.  However, consider the 
following example: the Anaheim Mighty Ducks
5
 hockey team was owned for many years by 
Walt Disney Corporation, a publicly traded company.
6
  Yet, the Ducks cannot be considered a 
stock market team because “neither fans nor investors will see much correlation between the 
corporations in question and the teams in question.”7  Buying Disney stock would not give the 
investor any sense of control over the sports team, as it was just one of many Disney 
subsidiaries.
8
  Conversely, investors of a stock market team can have a direct effect on the 
management of the franchise. 
 Sports teams considering an initial public offering (IPO) face numerous deterrents.  Most 
U.S. major sports leagues have rules in place to prevent or at least hinder efforts to go public.
9
  
                                                 
2 Brian Cheffins, Sports Teams and The Stock Market: A Winning Match? 32 U. Brit. Colum. L. Rev. 271, 272 
(1998). 
3 Id. at 272. 
4 Robert Bacon, Initial Public Offerings and Professional Sports Teams: The Regulations Work, But Are Owners 
and Investors Listening?, 10 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 139, 147, n.24 (2000). 
5 When the team was sold in 2005, the name was changed to Anaheim Ducks.  Anaheim's Ducks decide to drop 
'Mighty' from name, ASSOCIATED PRESS, (Jan. 27, 2006), http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/news/story?id=2308588.  
6
 Cheffins, supra note 2, at 273. 
7 Id. 
8 “For professional sports franchises with general corporate ownership, both financial performance and performance 
on the field will barely register when it comes to the financial results of the parent company.”  Ryan Schaffer, A 
Piece of the Rock (or The Rockets): The Viability of Widespread Public Offerings of Professional Sports Franchises, 
5 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 201, 205 (2006).  Other examples of teams owned by publicly traded companies include: 
the Chicago Cubs, owned by the Tribute Company; the Los Angeles Dodgers, owned by Rubert Murdoch’s News 
Corp.; the Philadelphia 76ers and Philadelphia Flyers owned by Comcast Corporation; the New York Knicks and 
New York Rangers, owned by Cablevision Systems; the Atlanta Thrashers, Atlanta Hawks, and Atlanta Braves, 
owned by AOL Time Warner; and the Anaheim Angels, which were also owned by Walt Disney Corporation.  Id. 
9 See generally Cheffins, supra note 2. 
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The actual earnings from Sports IPOs tend to be less than initially anticipated.
10
  Once public, 
teams may also have to disclose financial information, which can create tension between “on the 
field” success and financial success.  Yet those teams that decide to go public do obtain some 
distinct advantages.  Although the IPOs typically do not earn as much as is initially forecasted, 
average proceeds are often in the multi-millions of dollars,
11
 which can be used to build new 
stadiums, renovate older stadiums, pay players’ salaries and contribute to operating costs.  
Additionally, in the U.S., many sports teams can take advantage of decreased disclosure 
requirements as well as the ability to retain nearly all of the ownership stock and voting control 
through certain voting structures.   
On August 10, 2012, the Manchester United Football Club (Manchester United) of 
Manchester, England, owned by the Glazer family, conducted a much-publicized IPO on the 
New York Stock Exchange.
12
  The price of the initial offering was set at $14, much lower than 
the estimated $16-20 range that had been initially forecasted.
13
  The offering consisted of 16.6 
million shares
14
 and earned the club a total of $233 million, far below the anticipated $1 billion 
the club had hoped to earn from the IPO.
15
  There was also much negative media coverage 
                                                 
10 Bacon, supra note 4, at 140. 
11 For example, the Manchester United IPO earned $233 million.  Ajay Makan, “Chaotic IPO will leave Glazers 
satisfied” Financial Times, (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/31edc158-0191-11e2-81ba-
00144feabdc0.html#ixzz27c7NkArz.  The most recent Green Bay Packer IPO sold over 268,000 shares at $250 a 
piece, which is roughly $67 million.  “Community, Shareholders” Green Bay Packers, 
http://www.packers.com/community/shareholders.html [hereinafter GB Packers Community, Shareholders]. 
12 Makan, supra note 11. 
13 See Chris Smith, Manchester United IPO: History Says Don’t Buy, FORBES, (Aug. 10, 2012) 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2012/08/10/manchester-united-ipo-history-says-dont-buy/; Makan, supra 
note 11; Travis Hoium, Manchester United's IPO Misses Wide Left, AOL DAILY FINANCE, 8/14/12, 
http://www.dailyfinance.com/2012/08/14/manchester-united-ipo-misses-wide-left/. 
14 Smith, supra note 13. 
15 Makan, supra note 11. 
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surrounding the offering leading up to the sale, regarding the financial soundness of an 
investment in Manchester United.
16
   
Although the IPO was touted as a way for the team to reduce the large amount of debt 
being carried by the franchise,
17
 only approximately half of the proceeds from the IPO were be 
used to pay down Manchester United’s debt,18 a decision that was remarked upon quite harshly 
from fans and investors alike.
19
  The rest of the proceeds, $110 million, went directly to the 
Glazer family itself as profit.
20
  By going public in the U.S., Manchester United also qualified as 
an Emerging Growth Company under the recent U.S. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act 
(JOBS Act) of 2012 and therefore was not subject to the standard disclosure requirements faced 
by most publicly traded companies in the U.S.  Numerous other corporations made the move to 
go public in 2012 as well; however, not all were eligible for the advantages offered by the JOBS 
Act. 
                                                 
16 Roger Bennett, Great club … terrible investment?, ESPN, (Aug. 2, 2012), 
http://espn.go.com/sports/soccer/story/_/id/8227588/manchester-united-ipo-great-american-swindle-roger-bennett; 
Hoium, supra note 13; Smith, supra note 13. 
17 In 2005, the Glazer family conducted a leveraged buyout of Manchester United, costing £790 million or almost 
$1.5 billion and saddled the franchise with debt.  Glazer wins control of Man United, BBC NEWS, 5/12/2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4540939.stm.  See also Michael Moritz, Manchester United opens window on 
murky world of leveraged buy-outs, THE TELEGRAPH, 1/27/2010, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/7083750/Manchester-United-opens-window-on-
murky-world-of-leveraged-buy-outs.html. 
18 This arrangement was stated within the Manchester United Prospectus, which noted that half of the shares would 
be sold by the “selling shareholder” as known as the Glazer Family:  
 In this offering, we are selling 8,333,334 Class A ordinary shares and the selling shareholder 
named in this prospectus is selling 8,333,333 Class A ordinary shares. In connection with the sale 
by us, our net proceeds from the sale of our Class A ordinary shares in this offering at the initial 
public offering price of $14.00 per share will be approximately $110.3 million, after deducting 
estimated underwriting discounts and commissions.  …  We will not receive any proceeds from 
the sale of any Class A ordinary shares by the selling shareholder. 
Manchester United Prospectus, SEC Filings, 42, 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1549107/000104746912008161/a2210672z424b4.htm 
[HEREINAFTER Manchester United Prospectus]. 
19 Mark Potter, Manchester United fans group slams Glazers’ IPO plan, REUTERS, (July 31, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/31/us-manchesterunited-ipo-fans-idUSBRE86U0DC20120731.  See also 
Makan, supra note 11. 
20 Makan, supra note 11. 
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Although the fans may disagree, from the Glazer family’s perspective the IPO was a 
success.  The Glazers walked away with $110 million in their pockets, reduced the debts of 
Manchester United by a similar amount, and gave up merely 2% of the voting share of the 
company.
21
  Even though there will be administrative fees down the road as a result of having 
shareholders, these costs will almost certainly be paid for by the company, rather than by the 
Glazers.
22
   
 This article will argue that sports franchises that decide to IPO will do so in the U.S., as 
demonstrated by the recent Manchester United IPO.  Part I will discuss why sports teams choose 
to go public.  Part II will examine the JOBS Act of 2012 and the impact it can have on sports 
IPOs.  Part III will offer a discussion on the dual-class voting structure available in U.S. markets 
and the advantages of such a structure to sports teams.  Part IV will survey the changing 
landscape of league restrictions in the U.S., including charges of antitrust violations.  Finally, 
Part V will provide a review of the early market reaction to the Manchester United stock.  This 
article will show that the advantages of the U.S. Market as utilized by Manchester United 
indicate that sports teams looking to go public in the future will choose to do so in the U.S. 
I. Why Sports Teams Go Public 
There are numerous risks and rewards that result from an IPO for stock market teams.  
Teams can go public to relieve debt pressures, secure funding for stadiums and players, and 
provide exit options for owners.  In the case of Manchester United, the team’s need to relieve 
debt pressures was even greater due to the introduction of the Union of European Football 
                                                 
21 Bennett, supra note 16. 
22 This is solely my opinion based on the fact that the Glazers purchased Manchester United by conducting a 
leveraged buyout, placing on the risk and debt from the sale on the team rather than the owners as well as the 
decision to keep half of the IPO proceeds even though Manchester United’s debt exceeds £400mil.  See Manchester 
United Prospectus, supra note 18, at 29. 
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Associations (UEFA) Financial Fair Play Rules.  The downsides associated with going public 
include concerns about whether winning will take priority over financial success, legal disclosure 
obligations, and league restrictions with regard to public offerings. 
a. Advantages to Going Public for Sports Teams 
The ability to offer stock on a public market can provide sports teams with a potentially 
huge source of funding.
23
  Sports teams will sometimes pursue a public offering to raise funds 
for stadiums.
24
  Although the need to pay for stadiums out of the team’s pocket is typically 
considered a European problem,
25
 as North American cities have historically been willing to 
subsidize the cost of the stadium to keep the team in the city,
26
 times may be changing.
27
  A 
growing number of cities in the U.S. have become either unwilling or unable to provide teams 
with the funding for new stadiums or even renovations to older stadiums.
28
  Although the 
economy is beginning to slowly recover from the recession of 2008, cities may not be so quick to 
return to their pre-recession habits of funding multi-million dollar stadium projects and may 
                                                 
23 While a majority of the funding for sports teams in U.S. comes from local ticket sales and broadcast fees, these 
sources of funding are not easy to increase.  Schaffer, supra note 8, at 202-03.  Going public provides a creative 
source of additional capital.  Id.  Many major sports teams have encountered financial difficulties over the years that 
could be abated by a public offering of stock.  For example, eighteen of thirty NHL teams posted a loss in the 2010-
2011 season.  If the five top-earning teams are removed from the calculations, the remaining twenty-five NHL teams 
lost $86 million during the 2010-2011 season. This disparity in wealth throughout the league was a driving factor 
behind the most recent lockout in the 2012-2013 season.  Kurt Badenhausen, The NHL’s Problem: Only Three 
Teams Are Making Real Money, FORBES, (Sept. 18, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2012/09/18/nhl-lockout-is-all-about-the-benjamins-and-who-doesnt-
have-them/. 
24 Bacon, supra note 4, at 140-42.  European teams also may need to IPO to raise funds for player salaries and costs.  
Cheffins argues this is a result of a lack of “farm leagues,” drafts, free agency, and trades in the U.K. as well as the 
“transfer fees” that must be paid when a team acquires a player from another team.  Cheffins, supra note 2, at 276.  
North American teams don’t have to make these “one-off” cash outlays.  Id. 
25 U.K. teams typically use the floatation proceeds to build and improve stadiums.  This is because the stadiums are 
owned by the teams in the U.K., versus in the U.S. where the cities typically own the stadiums.  Cheffins, supra note 
2, at 275. 
26 3 of 4 U.S. “stock market teams” have not used their IPOs to build stadiums.  Bacon, supra note 4, at 153. 
27 See Bacon, supra note 4, at 143. 
28 Bacon, supra note 4, at 143. 
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continue to refuse or limit sports teams’ access to public funds.29  If this source of funding dries 
up, North American teams may find it necessary to go public to finance construction on their 
own.
30
  Alternatively, if teams are forced to expend internal funds for stadiums, they may find 
they lack the ability to pay player’s salaries and thereby look to go public for that reason.   
 Although many companies that go public may cite debt concerns as a motivating factor, 
debt control has become a forefront issue for football clubs in Europe.  In 2010, UEFA passed 
the Financial Fair Play (FFP) rules which will govern the allowable debt that can be carried by a 
club participating in UEFA competitions.
31
  Because clubs earn large amounts from participating 
in and even more for winning UEFA competitions,
32
 clubs will not break these rules lightly.
33
  
UEFA has stressed that the provisions are not “anti-debt”; so long as the clubs can service their 
                                                 
29 “Jockeying between major sports franchises and governments over the financing of new stadiums is nothing new, 
but the chilly reception the Atlanta proposal has gotten from the public and many state lawmakers is surprising some 
in this business-friendly state  . . .  Similar dynamics are playing out in Miami and Birmingham, Ala., as fans and 
taxpayers appear to be more circumspect about spending public money on stadiums used primarily by privately 
owned teams.”  Bill Barrow, In Ga., Stadium Opposition Signals Public Shift, ASSOCIATED PRESS, (Jan. 19, 2013), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/wireStory/ga-stadium-opposition-signals-public-shift-18258244. 
30 We already see an example of this with the Green Bay Packers.  Because the team had already issued stock 
publicly before the NFL banned the practice, the team was grandfathered in and allowed to continue.  Proceeds from 
Green Bay’s two most recent public offerings in 1997 and 2011 have been used to build or renovate Lambeau Field, 
where the Packers play.  Andrew Brandt, Buying A Piece of the Packers, FORBES, 12/8/11 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/sportsmoney/2011/12/08/buying-a-piece-of-the-packers/.  The IPO in 1923 and 
offering in 1935 were used to bail the team out of financial difficulties, while the 1950 offering was used to 
reclassify stock in order to limit the amount of shares an individual shareholder could hold.  Shareholder History & 
Financial History, Green Bay Packers, http://prod.static.packers.clubs.nfl.com/assets/docs/2011shareholder-
history.pdf [hereinafter GB Packers Shareholder History]. 
31 Ryan Murphy, Playing Fair in the Boardroom: An Examination of the Corporate Structures of European Football 
Clubs, 19 MICH. ST. U. COLL. L. J. INT’L L. 409, 413 (2010-2011). 
32 Clubs Benefit from Champions League Revenue, UEFA, (June 13, 2012), 
http://www.uefa.com/uefa/management/finance/news/newsid=1840934.html.  Many of the clubs that will be most 
limited by these rules pushed for their implementation.  Owners of major football franchises like Chelsea F.C., are 
concerned by the trending of continually training to outdo other teams and have asked UEFA to “save them from 
themselves.”  Daniel Geey, The UEFA Financial Fair Play Rules: A Difficult Balancing Act, 9 ESLJ 50 (2011).   
33 There is a question of whether UEFA will actual ban a team that violates the FFP rules from competitions.  
However, club may be unwilling to risk the possibility of being excluded from UEFA competitions.  UEFA has 
banned teams in the past for failing to comply with its rules.  Owen Gibson, Manchester City and PSG cannot 
‘cheat’ financial fair play, Uefa warns, THE GUARDIAN, (Feb. 4, 2013), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2013/feb/04/manchester-city-financial-fair-play (“[UEFA General Secretary 
Gianni] Infantino pointed to the fact that Uefa has excluded 34 clubs from competition under its existing rules, 
including Besiktas and Málaga, as evidence it would not hesitate to act if required.”). 
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debt, FFP rules will not be implicated.
34
  However, if the team’s profits cannot cover their 
interest payments on the debt, clubs will have reason to be concerned about the FFP rules.
35
 
An important aspect of the FFP rules is the “break-even requirement” which states that 
“UEFA determines that a club has broken even for the year when the relevant expenses exceed 
the relevant income by less than €5 million for the prior year.”36  These regulations will be 
phased in between 2012 and 2014.
37
  As they are phased in, Manchester United will have to be 
more diligent about servicing its debt load than it was previously required to be.
38
  Because 
participants and winners earn significant payouts from UEFA competitions,
39
 as well as bragging 
rights, elimination from the competitions would disappoint Manchester United’s fans and cost 
the team millions of pounds in revenue. 
                                                 
34 Geey, supra note 32, at 51.  This distinction was implemented for clubs like Manchester United in particular, that 
carry a very large debt load. 
35 Id.  For a discussion on how Manchester United has been working to increase its revenue since the IPO, see supra 
Section V.  
36  Murphy, supra note 31, at 414.  This change will be gradual – beginning with a €45 million gap for the 2013/14 
and 2014/15 seasons, decreases to €30 million for 2015/16 and 2016/17 seasons, and will continue until it gets to €5 
million.  Id. at 414 (citing UEFA Fair Play Regulations art. 61).  UEFA recently issued warnings to two clubs, 
Manchester City and Paris Saint-Germain, that they will not be allowed to cheat the FFP rules.  This warning stems 
from the fact that neither team would have passed the break-even test if it had been in place this year.  These two 
teams are not alone – in fact, forty-six other clubs would failed the break-even test as well.  Gibson, supra note 33. 
37 “The UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations, which were approved in May 2010 after an 
extensive consultation period and updated in the 2012 edition, are being implemented over a three-year period, with 
clubs participating in UEFA club competitions having their transfer and employee payables monitored since the 
summer of 2011, and the break-even assessment covering the financial years ending 2012 and 2013 to be assessed 
during 2013/14.”  Financial Fair Play, Union of European Football Associations 
http://www.uefa.com/uefa/footballfirst/protectingthegame/financialfairplay/index.html. 
38 Teams, including Manchester United, Liverpool, Tottenham Hotspur and Arsenal, are pushing for the FFP rules to 
be implemented outside of UEFA competitions in the Premier League, which is the top football league in Britain.  
Sunni Upal, Bring in Financial Fair Play! Liverpool Urge Premier League to Adopt UEFA's Tough Regulations, 
DAILYMAIL, (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-2263861/Liverpool-urge-Premier-
League-adopt-UEFAs-Financial-Fair-Play-regulations.html.   
39 In the UEFA Champions League alone, “€754.1m prize money [is] allotted to the 32 teams who figured from the 
group stage onwards consisted of €413m in fixed amounts plus €341.1m from the market pool. All of the 32 
participating clubs received a minimum €7.2m in accordance with the distribution system, comprising a 
participation bonus of €3.9m and €3.3m from the six €550,000 match bonuses given per group game.  Additionally, 
performance bonuses were paid in the group stage: sides received €800,000 for every win and €400,000 for every 
draw, with Madrid the only club to net the maximum €4.8m. The 16 clubs that reached the round of 16 were each 
assigned an additional €3m, the eight quarter-finalists an extra €3.3m, and the four semi-finalists a bonus of €4.2m.”   
“Clubs Benefit from Champions League revenue.” Geey, supra note 32. 
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Interestingly, many of the clubs that will be most limited by these rules are actually the 
same clubs pushing for their implementation.
40
  Although at first glance it may seem odd that 
these major franchises would request to be limited by outside forces, it actually makes a great 
deal of sense.  Owners of major football franchises are concerned by the trend of continually 
trying to outdo and outspend other teams and have asked UEFA to “save them from 
themselves.”41  This fear of being outspent by a rival franchise may have deterred sports teams 
from going public, where the team would be more limited as they tried to balance their books 
and uphold their fiduciary duties to shareholders.
42
  With the implementation of the FFP rules, 
clubs will no longer be able to continually outspend one another, allowing those that chose it to 
pursue the benefits of public offerings. 
 As the American public becomes more aware of debt and financial practices as a result 
of the recession, provisions such as the FFP Rules could be on the horizon in the U.S.  If the FFP 
rules achieve UEFA’s goals of improving football standards in Europe, protecting the integrity of 
UEFA competitions, improving the transparency, economic and financial capabilities, and 
credibility of clubs, among other things,
43
 law makers, league officials and fans alike may look 
                                                 
40 Geey, supra note 32. 
41 Id. 
42 “Those [teams] that do try to balance the books are hard-pressed to win bidding wars for players against owners 
who want success at all costs: free-spending Manchester City, for example, is owned by Mansour bin Zayed Al 
Nahyan, an Emirati sheikh.”  Losing Their Shirts: Do Sports and Stockmarkets Mix?, THE ECONOMIST, Sports 
Investments, (Sept. 8, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21562207.  
43 “Article 2 – Objectives.  1 These regulations aim: a) to further promote and continuously improve the standard of 
all aspects of football in Europe and to give continued priority to the training and care of young players in every 
club; b) to ensure that clubs have an adequate level of management and organisation; c) to adapt clubs’ sporting 
infrastructure to provide players, spectators and media representatives with suitable, well-equipped and safe 
facilities; d) to protect the integrity and smooth running of the UEFA club competitions; e) to allow the development 
of benchmarking for clubs in financial, sporting, legal, personnel, administrative and infrastructure-related criteria 
throughout Europe. 
2 Furthermore, they aim to achieve financial fair play in UEFA club competitions and in particular: a) to improve 
the economic and financial capability of the clubs, increasing their transparency and credibility; b) to place the 
necessary importance on the protection of creditors and to ensure that clubs settle their liabilities with players, 
social/tax authorities and other clubs punctually; c) to introduce more discipline and rationality in club football 
finances; d) to encourage clubs to operate on the basis of their own revenues; e) to encourage responsible spending 
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towards enacting similar provisions in the U.S.
44
  If that happens, sports teams may have to 
quickly balance their debts and equities, a feat that can be accomplished through a public 
offering.
45
 
There is another motivating factor at play in sports IPOs that is not typically found in 
average IPOs – the effect of fans.  This “fan investor” desires the team’s stock not because it is  
necessarily a financially-sound investment, but because the fan wishes to own part of the team.
46
  
As a result, share prices can be driven up far higher than the team’s financials would initially 
suggest, encouraging sports teams to conduct a public offering.  Robert Bacon rejects the idea of 
the fan effect, arguing that investors have taken notice of sports’ stocks poor performance and 
will not invest, as evidenced by the IPO of the Green Bay Packers in 1997, the proceeds of which 
fell short of initial predictions.
47
  However, Bacon is mistaken.  It is important to note that 
although the Green Bay Packers might have aimed much higher, they did in fact raise $24 
                                                                                                                                                             
for the long-term benefit of football; f) to protect the long-term viability and sustainability of European club 
football.” UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations, Edition 2012, UEFA.  
44 If the trend in the UK football leagues is any indication, U.S. teams themselves may request the leagues to impose 
these rules. 
45 See Marco Pagano, Fabio Panetta, and Luigi Zingales, Why DO Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis, 53 
J. OF FIN. 27, 29 (1998) (“Independent companies are more likely to go public after major investments and abnormal 
growth.  The IPO is followed by a reduction in leverage and investment.  So their decision to go public can be 
interpreted as an attempt to rebalance their balance sheet after larger investment and growth.”).  This study finds that 
the equity capital raised from an IPO is typically used to reduce leverage rather than finance new growth and 
investment.  The Manchester United IPO fits this model well.  These findings would also seem to indicate that the 
JOBS Act’s goal of job creation through IPOs from EGCs might be unrealistic. 
46 Investors receive “emotional satisfaction” from the purchase and stock certificates can serve as conversation 
pieces.  Bacon, supra note 4, at 153; Schaffer, supra note 8 at 222 (“Some of the most important benefits for a fan-
investor are psychic rather than tangible. It is the feeling of ownership of a treasured civic asset, of being 
part of the history and tradition of the team that they love. … Often, there is additional psychic pleasure in 
being able to pass on that membership to family members and friends. The same fan passed up the t-shirt and game 
ball when buying his fifteen-year-old son a birthday gift, instead buying him fifteen shares of the Boston Celtics, 
stating: ‘I hope he'll never sell it because it's sentimental.’”).   
47 Bacon, supra note 4 at 148.  Bacon argues that fans should buy memorabilia instead.  Id. at 165.  Another aspect 
of the Green Bay Packers’ IPOs that supports the fan effect idea is the location of shareholders.  In the 1997-98 
stock sale, 120,010 shares were sold, with 64,300 to Wisconsin residents, 9600 to Illinois residents, 4300 to 
Minnesota residents and 2800 to Michigan residents.  Genevieve F.E. Birren, NFL vs. Sherman Act: How the NFL's 
Ban on Public Ownership Violates Federal Antitrust Laws, 11 SPORTS LAW. J. 121, 130 (2004) (citing Packers 
Stock and Financial History, available at http://www.packers.com/history/stock_history/).  This amounts to over 
2/3rds of the shares were purchased by residents who live geographically close to Green Bay Wisconsin and have a 
higher likelihood of being fans of the Packers.  However, it is also important to note that the Green Bay Packers also 
focused their marketing efforts towards people in the local area.  Id. 
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million in the 1997 public offering while giving nothing to shareholders beyond a certificate and 
personal satisfaction.
48
  Furthermore, the Green Bay Packers have continued to offer stock since 
Bacon’s prediction, with a very successful offering in 2011.49  
Finally, it is well known that Manchester United managed to raise $233 million from its 
IPO, even if those earnings were far below initial projected numbers.
50
  It did so without giving 
up significant voting rights.
51
  This suggests that perhaps some savvy investors avoided the 
Manchester United IPO and instead the sale was driven by fans, violating Bacon’s prediction.52  
Even though various news outlets have repeatedly cautioned investors against sports IPOs,
53
 the 
fact that the sales continue to earn millions of dollars seems to indicate that the “fan effect” 
remains in play.  Although these fan investors may be misguided, as long as teams are able to 
continue to raise substantial funds without any significant loss of voting rights, ownership, or 
                                                 
48 GB Packers Shareholder History, supra note 30. 
49 GB Packers Community, Shareholders, supra note 11. 
50 Makan, supra note 11.  Another consideration is that the entire IPO market did not fare well in 2012.  Without the 
Facebook IPO, which had proceeds around $16 billion, the U.S. IPO market proceeds were the lowest they have 
been since the height of the financial crisis.  Thomas Zadvydas, After Tough Year for IPOs, Bankers Expect Active 
2013, THE DEAL PIPELINE, (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.thedeal.com/content/tmt/after-tough-year-for-ipos-bankers-
expect-active-2013.php.  This slow-down in the market may have depressed the Manchester United IPO proceeds.  
51 See infra Section III for an in depth look at the dual-class voting structure. 
52 Manchester United IPO’s on NYSE, CBC NEWS, BUSINESS, (Aug. 10, 2012), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/story/2012/08/10/manchester-united-ipo.html. 
53 See Smith, supra note 13 (“If you are planning to buy Manchester United stock, you may want to think again. … 
Shares in Manchester United might be a nice piece of merchandise for lifelong fans of the Red Devils, but history 
suggests that there is little reason to believe that it is actually a good investment.”); Kim Peterson, The Manchester 
United IPO Stinks, MSN MONEY, (Aug. 8, 2012), http://money.msn.com/top-stocks/post.aspx?post=7638d1df-b3cb-
483d-adae-4c943adbabcc (“Think the Facebook IPO was bad? Get a load of Manchester United, which will go 
public Friday. This is a first-class stinker.”); Damian Reece, Manchester United’s glory days on the stock market are 
behind it, THE TELEGRAPH, (July 4, 2012), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/damianreece/9375912/Manchester-Uniteds-glory-days-on-the-stock-
market-are-behind-it.html (“Ultimately the float seems to be an attempt by the Glazers to raise some cash to pay 
down its £423.2m of debt – hardly an appealing prospect for investors. While Man Utd may continue as a force on 
the pitch, its glory days as a stock market darling appear behind it.”); David Larrabee, Manchester United IPO: 
Yellow Card, ENTERPRISING INVESTOR, CFA INSTITUTE, (Aug. 8, 2012) 
http://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2012/08/08/manchester-uniteds-ipo-gets-a-yellow-card/ (“While the team’s 
iconic brand and loyal following are probably unsurpassed in professional sports, the valuation attached to United’s 
shares and the risk factors associated with ownership suggest that investors are likely better off sitting this one out 
on the sidelines.”). 
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other adverse effects to the primary owners, some sports teams will continue to offer stock 
publicly. 
b. Disadvantages to Going Public for Sports Teams 
There are also market factors at play that discourage sports teams from going public.  
One concern is that the goal of obtaining success “on the field” can be at odds with financial 
success.
54
  When the team remains in private hands, the owners are perfectly within their rights 
to favor “on the field success.”  However, once there are shareholders in the mix, directors of the 
company must consider the desire of the investors for profit or face the legal consequences.
55
  
For this reason, fans have expressed fears that IPOs will harm their team’s ability to win.  
According to Brian Cheffins, fans fear that because “[i]nvestors will demand a hard-nosed 
attitude toward money matters, team executive will feel compelled to sacrifice playing success, if 
this is required to save costs and increase profits available to shareholders.”56  Although Cheffins 
notes that there is no actual evidence of this,
57
 the sentiment remains with fans.
58
  Fans also fear 
increased ticket and merchandise prices resulting from a need to increase shareholder profits, 
                                                 
54 For example, while not publicly traded, London professional football club Arsenal has consistently focused on 
financial stability and success to the detriment of their on the field success over the past few years.  Arsenal Chief 
Executive Denies ‘Ruining the Club’ with Financial Focus, THE GUARDIAN, (Oct. 25, 2012), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2012/oct/25/arsenal-chief-executive-denies-ruining-club. 
55 In most cases, owners do not owe fiduciary duties to fans, however these duties will arise to shareholders once the 
team goes public.  Schaffer, supra note 8, at 227.  The Board of Directors will owe “the duty of loyalty [which] 
involves conflicts of interest for decision-makers, [and] . . . the duty of care [which] involves the procedure by 
which the board makes decisions.”  Id.  In most cases where the Board does not have a conflict of interest and has 
gathered some information, the courts will uphold the decision under the “business judgment rule.”  Id. at 227-28.  
The business judgment rule “gives directors broad discretion to take actions which, after careful consideration, they 
deem to be in the best interests of the company.”  Id.  If the original owners remain the majority shareholders after 
the IPO, they may also owe fiduciary duties to the minority shareholders.  Id. 
56 Cheffins, supra note 2, at 288.   
57 Id. at 289. 
58 It is also possible that this fear drives the “fan-investor” phenomenon; fans may believe that if they are the 
shareholders of their team, they can encourage “on the field” success.   
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which Cheffins has also found no evidence of in practice.
59
  Nonetheless, fans have maintained 
these fears.
 60
 
Even if teams find they are able to balance on and off the field success, they still must 
face other consequences of IPOs like legal disclosure obligations.
61
  Disclosure obligations 
subject teams to unwanted publicity about financials, which can take the focus away from the 
team itself.
62
  As previously discussed, the most financially-sound decision may be at odds with 
the decision that helps a team win.  Publicly traded teams may avoid making decisions that do 
not benefit the financial health of the organization, perhaps to the detriment of the team’s ability 
to win, because these decisions are made public.
63
  Recent legislation, in the form of the JOBS 
Act, changes these disclosure rules for some and may negate this downside of IPOs, at least in 
the short term.
64
 
American disclosure obligations have been noted to deter teams from going public in the 
U.S.
65
  Before the JOBS Act, if a company wanted to issue stock it had to either register with the 
                                                 
59 Cheffins, supra note 2, at 289.  In fact, Cheffins has found that fans have benefitted, because when you alienate 
customers, profits fall and shareholders lose – so really, the publicly traded team may need to cater more to the fans 
then when it is privately held.  Id. 
60 In their article entitled “Do Football Clubs Benefit from Initial Public Offerings?” Dirk Baur and Conor 
McKeating discuss the effect of an IPO on a football club.  They note that there are two distinct reasons for a team 
to IPO: to maximize either profits or wins.  Those that look to maximize profits will use the profits from the IPO to 
reduce debt or otherwise financially restructure the team.  Those that look to maximize wins will spend the profits 
on productive assets, either players or stadia.  Baur and McKeating’s research indicates that most teams are profit-
maximizers, as there is no change in performance after their IPOs.  Their conclusion is that IPOs do not improve 
“on-the-pitch” performance, excepting for lower division clubs in large leagues.  Dirk Baur & Conor McKeating, Do 
Football Clubs Benefit from Initial Public Offerings?, 6 INT’L J. SPORT FIN. VOL. 1, 40 (Feb. 2011).  This indicates 
that while the IPO does not necessarily improve the performance of the team, the fan’s fear that the IPO will harm 
the team is not shown.   
61 There are also costs associated with IPOs.  For example, a $5 million IPO might cost ~$700k.  Cheffins, supra 
note 2, at 280.  There are administrative burdens, like maintain registers of shareholders for proxy and voting 
purposes as well as paperwork associated with disclosure requirements, that continue after IPO is complete.  Id. at 
281.  These costs however are not specific to Sports IPOs, but rather are faced by all publicly traded companies. 
62 Id. at 280. 
63 This is not necessarily a bad thing; however it is certainly a factor to consider when examining the limited number 
of stock market teams. 
64 See infra Section II for further discussion of the JOBS Act. 
65 Cheffins, supra note 2, at 280. 
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or it had to meet a registration exemption.
66
  The 
most commonly used of these exemptions are Rule 506
67
 and Rule 144A.
68
  Rule 506 allows the 
company to make an offering to an unlimited amount of accredited investors plus 35 non-
accredited investors.
69
  Rule 144A allows a company to resell stock to qualified institutional 
buyers (QIBs) without registration.
70
  Neither of these exceptions allowed for general 
solicitations.
71
  Companies were also very hesitant to violate these rules, as doing so would 
provide investors with a right of recession, or ability to avoid the purchase.
72
  As a result, 
companies often would only engage in private offerings and were very restrictive with their 
publicity.
73
  Because privately-held companies in the U.S. are subject to very little disclosure 
obligations, IPOs do not appear very attractive.
74
   
 Finally, many North American sports leagues have restricted their teams’ ability to go 
public.  Over the past few decades only a handful of teams throughout North American sports 
leagues have been publicly traded.
75
  Each league has varying levels of restrictions, with no 
                                                 
66 Latham & Watkins, The JOBS Act, Part Deux: Frequently Asked Questions About Title II of the JOBS Act, Client 
Alert No. 1439, 1, 12/13/2012, www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/faq-jobs-act-title-II [hereinafter FAQ about Title II 
of JOBS Act]. 
67 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2011). 
68 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2011). 
69 FAQ about Title II of JOBS Act, supra note 66;  17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2011) ( “(2) Specific conditions (i) 
Limitation on number of purchasers. There are no more than or the issuer reasonably believes that there are no more 
than 35 purchasers of securities from the issuer in any offering under this section.  NOTE: See § 230.501(e) for the 
calculation of the number of purchasers and § 230.502(a) for what may or may not constitute an offering under this 
section.”) ; 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e) (2011) (“(e) Calculation of number of purchasers. For purposes of calculating the 
number of purchasers under §§ 230.505(b) and 230.506(b) only, the following shall apply: (1) The following 
purchasers shall be excluded … (iv) Any accredited investor.”). 
70 Id.  A qualified institutional buyer is one of a number of specifically delineated entities, listed in 17 C.F.R. § 
230.144A(a)(1) (2011). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. (“No one wants to violate Securities Act Section 5, which would give investors a right of rescission or “put” 
remedy. This harsh result has led to very restrictive publicity practices in private offerings in order to minimize the 
risk that the offering would fail to qualify as exempt from registration.”). 
74 Cheffins, supra note 2, at 279-80. 
75 Id. at 272-73. 
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major sports league completely permitting public offerings.
76
  Courts have acknowledged that 
policies limiting public ownership do contribute to the leagues’ ability to function effectively as 
it avoids a conflict of interest between shareholder goals and the league.
77
 
The National Hockey League (NHL) has limited public offerings by mandating that one 
shareholder within the organization must have ultimate voting control.
78
  Additionally, “teams 
cannot pay cash dividends unless they maintain adequate cash reserves and can meet the 
following year’s expenses without long-term debt financing.”79  These rules limit both the 
amount of shares NHL teams could offer as well as the attractiveness of an investment that has a 
cash dividend restricted in such a manner. 
 The National Football League (NFL) has a non-codified but pervasive blanket prohibition 
on teams being publicly traded.  The NFL rules prohibit corporate ownership of franchises as 
well.
80
  To block potential IPOs, the NFL makes a change in ownership to a multitude of 
shareholders extremely difficult, as it requires three-quarters of all owners to approve all 
transfers of ownership interests.
81
  The only team able to get around these rules and issue shares 
to the public is the Green Bay Packers, because the team had been doing so prior to the 
                                                 
76 Id. at 279 (“North American professional sports leagues have policies regulating the transfer of ownership of 
teams, and owners typically have been discouraged from selling a stake in their teams to the public.”). 
77 Sullivan v. Nat'l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1102 (1st Cir. 1994) (“Finally, we accept the NFL's claim that its 
public ownership policy contributes to the ability of the NFL to function as an effective sports league, and that the 
NFL's functioning would be impaired if publicly owned teams were permitted, because the short-term dividend 
interests of a club's shareholder would often conflict with the long-term interests of the league as a whole. That is, 
the policy avoids a detrimental conflict of interests between team shareholders and the league.”). 
78 Cheffins, supra note 2, at 279. 
79 Bacon, supra note 4, at 144 n. 27 (citing Scott C. Lascari, The Latest Revenue Generator: Stock Sales by 
Professional Sports Franchises, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 445 (1999)). 
80 Cheffins, supra note 2, at 279.  This practice is very typical across the other major sports leagues in the U.S.  See 
note 5 for a current list of teams owned by publicly traded companies.  See also PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF 
SPORT MANAGEMENT (Lisa Masteralexis et al. eds., 4th ed. 2012) (“The NFL has the most strict ownership rules.  It 
is the only league to prohibit corporate ownership of its franchises, which it has done since 1970.”).  The NFL also 
used to ban cross-ownership, or ownership of more than one sports franchise.  Id.  It has relaxed those rules, now 
allowing “an NFL owner to own other sports franchises in the same market or own an NFL franchise in one market 
and another franchise in another market, provided that market has no NFL team.”  Id.  
81 Id. 
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introduction of these NFL rules and was therefore grandfathered in.
82
  There have been many 
challenges to the NFL rules, with the NFL facing many allegations of antitrust violations for this 
ban against public offerings as well as other NFL rules.
83
  As a result, it is not clear that the NFL 
would be able to successfully challenge a team’s public offering in court. 
Major League Baseball (MLB) also limits the amount of ownership share that can be 
issued to the public, requiring that there be at least one majority shareholder in the 
organization.
84
  The MLB also restricts voting rights.
85
  Additionally, the MLB is the only major 
North American sports league to have a federal antitrust exception granted by the Supreme Court 
of the United States as it was found not to be a business in Federal Base Ball Club of Baltimore 
v. National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs.
86
  This is problematic, as challenges to 
limits on public offerings have been based in antitrust law, finding a league violated antitrust law 
by controlling individual teams’ ability to sell stock to the public.87  This makes it harder for 
baseball teams to challenge going public restrictions in court, at least on an antitrust basis.   
 Once a sports team has determined that going public is in its best interest, it must decide 
where its stock will be traded.  The combination of the JOBS Act, a dual-class voting structure 
and the recently successful Manchester United IPO makes the U.S. markets an apparent choice. 
II. JOBS Act Advantages for Sports IPOs 
                                                 
82 Bacon, supra note 4, at 145.  The Packers have issued stock in 1923, 1935, 1950, 1997, and 2011.  GB Packers 
Community, Shareholders, supra note 11.  See also Birren, supra note 47, at 139.   
83 See, e.g. Sullivan v. Nat'l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994), Murray v. Nat. Football League, 1996 
WL 363911 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 1996), Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010), St. Louis 
Convention & Visitors Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 154 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 1998).  See also infra Section IV: 
Changing Landscape of League Restrictions for further commentary on Sullivan and American Needle. 
84 Bacon, supra note 4, at 145. 
85 Id. 
86 Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Nat'l League of Prof'l Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).  See also Birren, 
supra note 47, at 124. 
87 See infra Section IV: Changing Landscape of League Restrictions for further commentary on Sullivan and 
American Needle. 
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 The JOBS Act was enacted in 2012 to “increase American job creation and economic 
growth by improving access to the public capital markets for emerging growth companies.”88  It 
creates the concept of Emerging Growth Companies (EGCs) which are defined as issuers of 
stock with less than $1 billion in gross annual revenue.
89
  The JOBS Act revises the Securities 
Act of 1933 (’33 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (’34 Act)90 to ease IPO 
restrictions for small businesses.
91
  An EGC will retain its status for five years unless its gross 
annual revenue exceeds $1 billion, more than $1 billion in non-convertible debt is issued over a 
three year period, or the issuer is considered a large accelerated filer under 17 CFR 240.12b–2.92  
EGCs are also exempt from requirements for executive compensation shareholder approval of 
both say-on-pay rules and golden parachute compensation.
 93
  
                                                 
88 JUMPSTART OUR BUSINESS STARTUPS ACT, PL 112-106, April 5, 2012, 126 Stat 306 (hereinafter “JOBS Act”). 
89 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(a)(19). 
90 JOBS ACT, supra note 88. 
91 “[The JOBS Act] is a legislative package that we believe will help jump-start our economy by creating new 
growth opportunities for America's small businesses, for start-up companies, and for entrepreneurs.”  158 CONG. 
REC. H1234-01 (March 7, 2012) (statement by Rep. Bachus). 
92 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(19) (“The term ‘emerging growth company’ means an issuer that had total annual gross 
revenues of less than $1,000,000,000 … an issuer that is an emerging growth company as of the first day of that 
fiscal year shall continue to be deemed an emerging growth company until the earliest of-- 
“(A) the last day of the fiscal year of the issuer during which it had total annual gross revenues of $1,000,000,000 
(as such amount is indexed for inflation every 5 years by the Commission to reflect the change in the Consumer 
Price Index for All Urban Consumers published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, setting the threshold to the nearest 
1,000,000) or more; 
“(B) the last day of the fiscal year of the issuer following the fifth anniversary of the date of the first sale of common 
equity securities of the issuer pursuant to an effective registration statement under this title; 
“(C) the date on which such issuer has, during the previous 3–year period, issued more than $1,000,000,000 in non-
convertible debt; or 
“(D) the date on which such issuer is deemed to be a ‘large accelerated filer’, as defined in section 240.12b–2 of title 
17, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor thereto.”). 
93 15 U.S.C. § 78n–1(2) Treatment of Emerging Growth Companies (A) In General.--An emerging growth company 
shall be exempt from the requirements of subsections (a) and (b).  JOBS Act, PL 112-106, April 5, 2012, 126 Stat 
306.  Subsections (a) and (b) of § 78n–1 contain both say-on-pay rules (§ 78n-1(a)) and golden parachute executive 
compensation rules (§ 78n-1(b)):  
(a) Separate resolution required.  (1) In general: Not less frequently than once every 3 years, a 
proxy or consent or authorization for an annual or other meeting of the shareholders for which the 
proxy solicitation rules of the Commission require compensation disclosure shall include a 
separate resolution subject to shareholder vote to approve the compensation of executives, as 
disclosed pursuant to section 229.402 of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor 
thereto. 
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a. Manchester United and the JOBS Act 
 The legislative record on the JOBS Act does not indicate that Manchester United was the 
type of company the law was aimed towards.  Instead, a sponsor of the bill explained, 
…As a small business owner, I know that it's tough to get access to capital. If a 
company doesn't have the resources it needs to grow and expand, then it's 
virtually impossible to hire new workers. … H.R. 3606, [] would make it easier 
for companies to access capital markets and ease the overwhelming regulations 
that these young businesses encounter.
94
 
Throughout its legislative record, the JOBS Act is continually touted as a bill aimed to 
help small businesses and start-ups.
95
 
As a company with less than $1 billion in revenue
96
 that had not gone public in the U.S. 
before December 2011, Manchester United qualifies as an EGC.
97
  Manchester United is not the 
picture of “emerging growth,” as it is neither small nor young.  Formed in 1892,98 self-described 
as “one of the most popular and successful sports teams in the world,”99 most would not consider 
                                                                                                                                                             
(b) Shareholder approval of golden parachute compensation.  (1) Disclosure: …[T]he person 
making such solicitation shall disclose in the proxy or consent solicitation material, … any 
agreements or understandings that such person has with any named executive officers of such 
issuer … concerning any type of compensation … that is based on or otherwise relates to the 
acquisition, merger, consolidation, sale, or other disposition of all or substantially all of the assets 
of the issuer and the aggregate total of all such compensation that may … be paid or become 
payable to or on behalf of such executive officer. 
15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (emphasis added). 
94157 CONG. REC. H9801-01 (Dec. 16, 2011) (statement by Rep. Dold) (emphasis added).  Furthermore, the House 
Report on the JOBS Act says, “[t]o encourage small companies to go public in the U.S., to spur economic growth, 
and to create jobs, Representatives Fincher and Carney introduced H.R. 3606 on December 8, 2011.”  H.R. 406, 
112th Cong. (2012).  H.R. 3606 would go on to become the JOBS Act. 
95 For example, Rep. Hurt described the JOBS Act as a bill that “collectively reduces burdens that prevent small 
businesses from accessing the capital necessary to hire and expand, and it encourages our entrepreneurs to get their 
start-ups off the ground.”  158 CONG. REC. H1234-01 (March 7, 2012). 
96 “Total revenue for the years ended June 30, 2009, 2010 and 2011 was £278.5 million, £286.4 million and 
£331.4 million, respectively.”  Manchester United Prospectus, supra note 18, at 3. 
97 Manchester United Prospectus, supra note 18, at 7. 
98 Murphy, supra note 31, at 437. 
99 Manchester United Prospectus, supra note 18, at 1.  Manchester United also had a total indebtedness of 
£423.3 million as of March 31, 2012.  Manchester United Prospectus, supra note 18, at 29. 
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Manchester United to be the “start-up” company that the JOBS Act was looking to aid.100  
Nonetheless, Congress chose to set the limits very high.
 101
   
 So although it may not have been Congress’ intent to include companies like Manchester 
United in the EGC category, it does open up a great window of opportunity for many sports 
organizations.  For example, in 2010, Forbes released a list of financial information for Major 
League Baseball teams, including annual revenues for 2009.
102
  Atop this list was the New York 
Yankees, with revenues of $441 million
103
 – less than half of the maximum revenue allowed to 
an EGC.  This demonstrates that as of 2009, all MLB teams would be eligible for EGC status if 
they chose to go public in the U.S. – no team would be excluded, as none were already public as 
of December 8, 2011.
104
  Similarly, all NHL teams would be eligible for EGC status if they were 
                                                 
100 According to its sponsors, the JOBS Act “will create jobs and grow the economy.”  158 CONG. REC. H906-05 
(Feb. 17, 2012) (statement by Rep. Carney).  It is unclear how the IPO of Manchester United will do either.  Instead, 
by instituting such high maximum thresholds, Congress invited many businesses to IPO in the U.S. and profit from 
the system without providing much, if any, benefit to the American public. 
101 Congress did consider two amendments to the JOBS Act that would have lowered the gross annual revenue cap 
to $750k and require EGCs to comply with say-on-pay and golden parachute shareholder votes, however both were 
voted down.  158 CONG. REC. D204-01 (March 7, 2012).  (Himes amendment “sought to lower the gross annual 
revenue cap from $1,000,000,000 to $750,000,000 for emerging growth companies to remain eligible for the 
regulatory on-ramp and strike the public float requirement for the on-ramp” was voted down by 81 votes and Ellison 
amendment “sought to require Emerging Growth Companies to fully comply with say-on-pay and golden parachute 
shareholder votes” was voted down by 75 votes.  Rep. Himes testified in front of the House regarding the $1 billion 
maximum stating,  
[M]y belief is that this is far too expansive a definition of emerging growth companies. It's not just 
my belief. We heard in the hearing which we held on this bill from Mr. LeBlanc that something 
more like $250 million to $500 million in revenues would be appropriate. I offered in committee 
the notion similar to this amendment that we make the cap $750 million in revenues.  …  It's hard 
to know-a billion dollars in revenue is an abstraction. Let me give you an example. I have a list of 
the IPOs that have occurred in the last couple of years. Currently, what I think of as a fine 
company, Spirit Airlines, with some $800 million in revenues, would qualify as an emerging 
growth company. They went public in May of 2011.Spirit Airlines is an established airline with 
2,400 employees. They clearly are a company that has the capability to comply with the full array 
of protections that are there for investors and others.  …  I think $750 million in revenue is a more 
appropriate benchmark and, therefore, I propose this amendment.   
158 CONG. REC. H1234-01 (March 7, 2012). 
102 The Business of Baseball, FORBES, (April 7, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/lists/2010/33/baseball-valuations-
10_The-Business-Of-Baseball_Revenue.html. 
103 Id.  
104 JOBS ACT, supra note 88.  The Green Bay Packers are the only major North American sports team that would be 
excluded by this provision, as they are currently public in the United States and have been since 1923.  GB Packers 
Community, Shareholders, supra note 11. 
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to go public in the U.S., as the team with the highest revenues is the Toronto Maple Leafs with 
$200 million in revenue in 2012.
105
 
One downside to the JOBS Act for sports teams is that the EGC status is not permanent.  
Even if the sports team remains below the $1 billion maximum gross annual revenue and meets 
the other qualifications, after five years the team will lose its EGC status and will be forced to 
comply with disclosure obligations mandated by the ’33 and ’34 Act.106   
Although the team could elect to go private at that point and avoid disclosure, the process 
of going private is not as simple as going public under the JOBS Act.
107
  In order to take a 
company private, the shareholders must be limited to three hundred or eliminated altogether.
108
  
The most common ways to do this are through: a cash-out merger, a tender offer, a reverse stock 
split that leaves minority shareholders with fractional shares, or a sale of all or substantially all of 
the assets of the company.
109
  However each of these methods requires planning and implicates 
many regulations, as well as fiduciary duties, that teams will not wish to violate.
110
  Going 
public, especially for a company that can take advantage of the JOBS Act, is much easier and 
cleaner than is often the case when going private.  As such, many sports teams may not be 
                                                 
105 NHL Team Values: The Business of Hockey, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/nhl-valuations/list/ (last visited 
Mar. 11, 2013). 
106 JOBS ACT, supra note 88.   
107 It can also be legally messy.  For example, throughout the 1960’s the New England Patriots (then the Boston 
Patriots) were privately owned by ten shareholders, with the owner of the franchise William Sullivan as the 
president.  Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1112, 1114 (1986).  By the mid-1970s, 
however, Sullivan had been ousted from the presidency and began buying up shares from other shareholders in order 
to regain control of the corporation.  Id.  He was ultimately successful and proceeded to create a new corporation 
(New Patriots) and merge the existing corporation (Old Patriots) into it.  Id. at 1115.  As a result, the voting stock of 
the Old Patriots was extinguished and non-voting stock was cashed out for $15 a share.  Id.  This resulted in a 
number of lawsuits.  In Coggins, shareholders who voted against the merger sought its undoing.  In another suit, 
Sarrouf v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1122 (1986), non-voting shareholders challenged 
the $15 per share price and sought to have the court determine fair value of their shares.  Finally, in Pavlidis v. New 
England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 737 F.2d 1227, 1229 (1st Cir. 1984), a class of shareholders who initially voted 
to accept the $15 share price offer brought suit arguing they had been induced to accept the offer by a misleading 
proxy statement.  Although in this case the Patriots were not publicly traded, each of these suits could result from a 
going private transaction. 
108 Gregory R. Samuel & Sally A. Schreiber, Going Private Transactions, 40 TEX. J. BUS. L., 85, 89 (2004). 
109 Samuel & Schreiber, supra note 108, at 89. 
110 Id. at 91. 
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swayed by the JOBS Act alone, knowing that in five years it will either have to go private or be 
subject to the disclosure rules of the ’33 and ’34 Acts. 
Although some teams may be so strapped for cash in the present that they will ignore 
these future disclosure obligations, others which are able to better consider the long term effects 
of going public in the U.S. may be deterred by this five-year EGC status limit.  When the JOBS 
Act is considered in combination with the dual-class voting structure of the U.S., however, teams 
may be more willing to go public. 
b. Other Recent IPOs and the JOBS Act 
 Numerous non-sports teams have also taken advantage of the JOBS Act.  Throughout 
2012, sixty-one companies went public as EGCs under the JOBS Act, while thirty large 
ineligible companies went public without the benefits of the JOBS Act.
111
  Interestingly, the 
shares of U.S. companies that went public using the JOBS Act outperformed shares in companies 
that did not or could not utilize the JOBS Act.
112
  On average, shares in companies utilizing the 
JOBS Act have risen 28.9% from their initial offer price, whereas non-JOBS Act companies’ 
                                                 
111 Olivia Oran, IPO VIEW – U.S. Jobs Act Companies Outperform Other IPOs, Data Shows, Reuters (Jan. 25, 
2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/25/jobs-act-ipos-idUSL1N0ARB2C20130125.  Some of the 
companies that filed as emerging growth companies, in addition to Manchester United, were Legal Zoom, LifeLock, 
Tumi and Bright Horizons.  Becky Yerak, JOBS Act Intended to Help Workforce Grow, But Investor Advocates 
Have Concerns, THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE, (Dec. 9, 2012), available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-12-
09/business/ct-biz-1209-emerging-companies--20121209_1_jobs-act-investor-advocates-growth-companies.  An 
issue that has arisen regarding emerging growth companies is the idea of “blank-check” or special-purpose 
acquisition companies.  These are basically shell companies that file without any employees or operations, but are 
created in order to allow current privately held companies to go public through a reverse merger.   Emily Chasan, 
Meet the JOBS Act’s Jobs-Free Companies, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, (June 4, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303506404577443980893828956.html.  Many have cited concerns 
that these “blank check” companies will actually result in investor fraud, rather than job creation.  For example, the 
very first company to file under the JOBS Act as an EGC, Caribbean Pacific Marketing, was a “blank check” 
company.  Interestingly, Caribeean Pacific Marketing was not even a company prior to its filing.  Instead, it hoped to 
use the funds from the IPO to start the business.  The company was shortly thereafter charged by the SEC with 
fraud, stemming from inaccuracies in the prospectus.  Though it is unclear whether the advantages of the JOBS Act 
influenced the company to commit fraud, it is clear that emerging growth companies may not all be the job creators 
that the JOBS Act was supposed to aid.  Floyd Norris, Fraud Case Delayed By 2 Months, NY TIMES, (Nov. 1, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/02/business/sec-charges-company-that-filed-under-jobs-act-with-
fraud.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&. 
112 Id. 
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shares have only risen 13.1%.
113
  Although there may be other factors at play, like the relative 
newness of the JOBS Act and the positive trends of the U.S. stock markets,
114
 this data shows 
both that companies are utilizing the JOBS Act and that their stocks have not been held back as a 
result. 
 One of the most anticipated IPOs of 2013 is that of Gilt Groupe, an online luxury retailer.  
Although valued at $1 billion in May 2012, with revenues in 2011 of $370 million, it would 
qualify under the JOBS Act.
115
  Conversely, some of the biggest IPOs of this past year, 
specifically Facebook, did not take advantage of the JOBS Act.  Facebook was ineligible for the 
JOBS Act as a result of its revenues, which totaled over $3.7 billion in 2011.
116
 
 Like sports teams, other corporations might not be swayed to go public in the U.S. by the 
JOBS Act alone, particularly due to its five-year time limit on certain disclosures.  However, like 
Manchester United, other companies may find that when the JOBS Act benefits are combined 
with the dual-class voting structure in the U.S., that the U.S. market is the preferred market 
location for initial public offerings. 
III. Dual-Class Voting Structure and Maintaining Owner Control 
  Before going public, sports teams are typically owned and managed by a relatively small 
number of individuals.  On the whole, these owners will want to preserve their existing power 
when going public.  A dual-class voting structure allows the pre-IPO owners to retain their 
voting strength by allowing new stock to have significantly less voting power per share.   
                                                 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Spencer E. Ante and Dana Mattioli, Gilt’s Flash Hunt: New Chief for IPO, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, (Nov. 8, 
2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323894704578107303377319238.html. 
116 Facebook, Inc., Prospectus (May 18, 2012). 
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A dual-class voting structure provide companies with an opportunity to raise capital 
without altering the control of current owners.
117
  A class of “super-voting” stock118 is distributed 
to current owners, while creating another class of stock with diminished voting rights to be sold 
in the public offering.
119
  Because public investors are aware of this inequitable structure from 
the outset, a dual-class voting structure is not considered to be disenfranchising when used in a 
initial public offering.
120
  Instead, under the efficient capital markets hypothesis,
121
 the market 
should take this aspect of the shares into account and adjust the price of the share accordingly.
122
  
Often, it is the founder and/or creator that wishes to maintain creative control over the 
company that employs a dual-class voting structure.  This structure has been utilized in recent 
IPOs like Google, Facebook, and LinkedIn, where the owners of the company argue they need to 
protect the company’s public mission123 and focus on long term goals without being subject to 
short-term market fluctuations and changes of course that can result.
124
  However, there is no 
indication in the Manchester United IPO that the pre-IPO owners, the Glazer family, provide 
Manchester United with such unique and integral leadership that it must be protected at the 
                                                 
117 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI AND JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DUAL CLASS COMMON STOCK, DEL. L. OF CORP. AND BUS. 
ORG.S. § 6.49 (2013). 
118  Usually, this new class of stock has disproportionately high voting rights, lower dividend and liquidation rights 
than the common stock, and is subject to substantial transfer restrictions, except that it can be converted into 
common stock at any time.  Id. at 117. 
119 Id. 
120 Douglas C. Ashton, Revisiting Dual-Class Stock, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 863, 884 (1994).  In contrast, a dual-class 
voting structure is not typically allowed in companies already public as it strips current shareholders of their voting 
rights.  Id. at 866, n. 12 (“In 1988, the SEC announced the adoption of Rule 19c- 4 under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934. Exchange Act Release No. 25,891 [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P 84,247, at 
89,208 - 09 (July 7, 1988), . . .  This rule prohibits the common stock of a company from being or remaining listed 
on an exchange if the company issues securities or takes other actions that would have the effect of nullifying, 
restricting, or disparately reducing the per share voting rights of existing common stock shareholders. Id. An initial 
public offering of securities, however, is presumed not to be a disenfranchising action. [] Rule 19c-4(a)(1).”). 
121 “The weak form of the efficient capital market hypothesis, which has been subject to rigorous empirical scrutiny, 
has established that current price movements fully reflect any information contained in previous stock prices, thus 
the history of securities prices does not yield exploitable trading opportunities.”  ASHTON, supra note 109, at 934-35. 
122 Ashton, supra note 120, at 935.  
123 James Surowiecki, Unequal Shares, THE NEW YORKER, (May 28, 2012), 
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2012/05/28/120528ta_talk_surowiecki. 
124 See The Two Sides Of Dual-Class Shares, INVESTOPEDIA, (Jan. 8, 2012) 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/fundamental/04/092204.asp#axzz2Bs5Nenvp. 
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expense of the public investors.  Nor is there a great concern that public investors will change 
Manchester United in such a way that conflicts with its public mission.  It is more likely that the 
Glazer family is simply unwilling to relinquish any significant amount of control.  However, 
because motivation is not relevant under U.S. law, the Glazer family was free to impose a dual-
class voting structure on the IPO. 
Although there does not appear to be anything extraordinary about the Glazers’ 
leadership of Manchester United to suggest a dual-class voting structure was necessary,
125
 many 
sports teams would and should find this option attractive.  As previously stated, one fear about 
taking a sports team public is that “on the field” success will be sacrificed for financial success 
by those investors uninterested in the team’s record at the end of its season.126  While there is 
reason to question this fear, as it is clear that teams that are successful “on the field” can earn 
additional revenues, perhaps secure better sponsorships and other financial benefits that stem 
from success, the dual-class voting structure can put current owners and fans at ease and cause 
them to be more willing to go public.  Because the managers’ fiduciary duties to not require them 
to always put profit over the team’s “on the field” success, those managers put in place by the 
existing owners, who retain control under this structure, may be more willing to balance the two 
concerns as compared to managers elected by investors solely looking to profit. 
In the Manchester United IPO, the Glazer family was able to retain 98% of the voting 
share
127
 of the stock while issuing approximately 10% of the shares.
128
  They were able to do this 
                                                 
125 Bennett, supra note 16 (“Andy Green, a football finance blogger, explained, ‘Larry Page and Sergey Brin built 
Google from nothing into one of the world's greatest companies with their unique vision. There is nothing unique 
about the Glazers that necessitates their control of United has to be uniquely preserved.’”). 
126 See supra Section I(b): Disadvantages of Going Public for Sports Teams, for a discussion regarding fears about 
the effects of public ownership on “on the field” success.  
127 “Upon the closing of this offering, the shares owned by our principal shareholder will represent 98.7% of the 
voting power of our outstanding capital stock.”  Manchester United Prospectus, supra note 18, at 31. 
128 In the IPO, Manchester United issued 16,666,667 of 163,685,700 total shares.  Manchester United Prospectus, 
supra note 18, at 8. 
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because under the dual-class voting structure, Class B shares, owned by the Glazer family, 
received ten votes per share, while Class A shares, the only shares available to public investors, 
only received one vote per share.
129
  Of the 16.6 million Class A shares issued,
130
 American 
billionaire George Soros purchased a 7.85% stake, or approximately 3.1 million shares.
131
  This 
gives Soros a 1.9% stake in the club,
132
 however there is no immediate concern regarding Soros’ 
acquisition, although large.  Because Class A shares have such a diminished voting power, Soros 
essentially comes away with no voting power and, additionally, no immediate financial benefits 
as Manchester United does not issue dividends.
133
 
 Many markets around the world do not allow this type of voting-right inequity.  Neither 
the U.K. nor Hong Kong markets allow a dual-class voting structure and as a result neither was 
chosen as the forum for the Manchester United IPO.
134
  The fact that Manchester United chose 
not to IPO in the U.K. or Hong Kong, both of which were more natural markets for the team than 
                                                 
129 The Glazer Family owns all Class B stock.  Class A stock was issued in the IPO.  “The rights of the holders of 
our Class A ordinary shares and our Class B ordinary shares are identical, except with respect to voting and 
conversion. Each Class A ordinary share is entitled to one vote per share and is not convertible into any other shares 
of our capital stock. Each Class B ordinary share is entitled to 10 votes per share and is convertible into one Class A 
ordinary share at any time.”  Manchester United Prospectus, supra note 18, at 8. 
130 Smith, supra note 13. 
131 Manchester United: George Soros invests in football club, BBC NEWS, (Aug. 21, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-19328750. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 “[Manchester United] passed over the Hong Kong Stock Exchange because it would not give the team a waiver 
to allow two classes of shares, with different voting rights. The London Stock Exchange also does not allow such 
share structures, perhaps the reason this natural home was skipped over by the Glazers.”  Steven M. Davidoff, In 
Manchester United’s I.P.O., a Preference for American Rules, NYTIMES DEALBOOK, (July 10, 2012), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/10/in-manchester-uniteds-i-p-o-a-preference-for-u-s-rules/.  Interestingly, 
Hong Kong had been the top venue for IPOs in the world from 2009-2011.  However, when Manchester United 
moved to NY and another pulled its listing, NY regained its holding as the top venue for IPOs.  Anuj Gangahar, 
Equities: AIA Stake Sale Boosts First-quarter Hopes, EUROMONEY, 
http://www.euromoney.com/Article/3135679/Category/15/ChannelPage/0/Equities-AIA-stake-sale-boosts-first-
quarter-hopes.html?type=CategoryArticle&ArticleId=3135679&CategoryID=15&PageID=0; see also Deloitte 
Releases Statistics on Hong Kong and Mainland IPOs in 2012, DELOITTE, (Jan. 1, 2013), 
http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_CN/cn/Pressroom/pr/98b4f30f818fb310VgnVCM3000003456f70aRCRD.htm 
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the U.S.,
135
 strongly indicates that the dual-class voting structure was high on Manchester 
United’s list of priorities.136 
IV. Changing Landscape of League Restrictions 
Over the past two decades, sports leagues have faced many antitrust challenges from 
players, teams within the leagues, suppliers, and others.  Antitrust challenges have fought 
restrictions against going public, exclusive manufacturing and sale licenses, and required central 
contracting with league, among other things.  Many of these challenges have weakened the 
position of the leagues to control the individual actions of sports teams.  Alone, these are likely 
not enough to compel sports teams to challenge the league restrictions in court.  However, with 
the availability of the dual-class voting structure and the JOBS Act, teams may determine that it 
is in their best interest to fight the leagues on these restrictions. 
                                                 
135 Manchester United had also considered Singapore, as the country had initially indicated that it would allow for a 
dual-class voting structure.  However, as the final determination on this was delayed while Asian markets continued 
to cool, Manchester United chose to IPO in the U.S.  Davidoff, supra note 122.  After the IPO was completed in the 
U.S., Singapore Exchange (SGX) “clarified in a recent release that dual class voting shares are ‘not allowed’ after 
rumors that the famous English soccer team Manchester United was planning on listing on SGX using a dual class 
structure.”  Norman P. Ho, A Tale of Two Cities: Business Trust Listings and Capital Markets in Singapore and 
Hong Kong, 11 J. INT'L BUS. & L. 311, 328-329 (2012) (citing The Capital Structure of Listed Companies in 
Singapore, Singapore Stock Exchange, Dual-Class Voting Shares, 
http://www.sgx.com/wps/wcm/connect/sgxen/Misc/regulations/Regulators/The+Capital+Structure+of+Listed+Com
panies+in+Singapore; Michelle Quah, Man U IPO Kicks up Interest in Dual-Class Shares, THE BUSINESS TIMES-
SINGAPORE COMPANIES, (Sep. 6, 2011), http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/sub/premiumstory/0,4574,455019-
BTMarkets IPOWatch,00.html?).  Manchester United was one of three major floatations to pull out of the Singapore 
market in 2012, the others being India’s Reliance Communications and motor-sport group Formula One.  As a 
result, the Singapore market is still working to recover.  Chun Han Wong, Mapletree Debut Sparks Hope for 
Singapore IPOs, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, (Mar. 7, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323628804578345672375308546.html. 
136 “[Manchester United] might have fared better in Asia, where it has a large and growing fan base that would have 
been drawn to the shares, said Ronald Wan, a Hong Kong-based managing director at China Merchants Securities, 
which oversees about $1.5 billion.  ‘U.S. investors are not as enthusiastic about soccer as those in former British 
colonies like Singapore and Hong Kong,’ he said. ‘Market reactions might be slightly better if the deal was done in 
Asia.’”  Lee Spears & Tariq Panja, Manchester United Little Changed Following the IPO, BLOOMBERG, (Aug. 10, 
2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-09/manchester-united-raises-233-3-million-pricing-ipo-below-
range.html. 
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In 1994, in Sullivan v. National Football League, an antitrust claim was brought by then-
owner of the New England Patriots, William Sullivan, regarding the NFL policy against public 
offerings by teams.
137
  Sullivan argued that the policy depressed competition and forced him to 
sell the team at a much lower price to a private buyer than if he had been able to list the team 
publicly.
138
  The NFL defended its policy, arguing that “NFL's functioning would be impaired if 
publicly owned teams were permitted, because the short-term dividend interests of a club's 
shareholder would often conflict with the long-term interests of the league as a whole.”139  It was 
the NFL’s position that this rule helped to avoid a conflict of interest between the league and 
team shareholders.
140
  Sullivan in return proposed options to the outright ban on public offerings, 
suggesting sales of nonvoting stock, restricting individuals’ holdings, and allowing the NFL to 
control dividends, among other things.
141
 
The Sullivan court determined that a reasonable jury could find that the NFL policy 
against public offerings harmed team owners by restricting the sale of teams to private buyers.
142
  
This ruling will be key in any future challenges to league restrictions on public offerings of 
stock.  The court also found that the teams of the NFL did not constitute a single enterprise, a 
                                                 
137 Sullivan v. Nat'l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994). 
138 Id. at 1103 (“‘But for’ the NFL's policy, Sullivan claims, he would have been able to offer 49% of the Patriots to 
the public for $70 million, pay off his debts, and retained ownership of a much more valuable and profitable team.”). 
139 Id. at 1102 (“Finally, we accept the NFL's claim that its public ownership policy contributes to the ability of the 
NFL to function as an effective sports league, and that the NFL's functioning would be impaired if publicly owned 
teams were permitted, because the short-term dividend interests of a club's shareholder would often conflict with the 
long-term interests of the league as a whole. That is, the policy avoids a detrimental conflict of interests between 
team shareholders and the league.”). 
140 Id.  
141 Id. at 1103 (“The record contains evidence of a less restrictive alternative to the NFL's ownership policy that may 
yield the same benefits as the current policy. Sullivan points to one proposal to amend the current ownership policy 
by allowing for the sale of minority, nonvoting shares of team stock to the public with restrictions on the size of the 
holdings by any one individual. Dividend payments, if any, would be within the firm control of the NFL majority 
owner. Under such a policy, it would be reasonable for a jury to conclude that private control of member clubs is 
maintained, conflicts of interest are avoided, and all the other “benefits” of the NFL's joint venture arrangement are 
preserved while at the same time teams would have access to the market for public investment capital through the 
sale of ownership interests.”). 
142 Id.  The Court also concluded that jury instructions had been erroneous and that the lower court had erroneously 
refused to send some evidence to the jury for consideration, and thus ordered a new trial.  Id.  The case eventually 
settled.  Cheffins, supra note 2, at 279.   
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finding necessary for an antitrust challenge, because the individual teams “compete with each 
other, both on and off the field, for things like fan support, players, coaches, ticket sales, local 
broadcast revenues, and the sale of team paraphernalia.”143  The court ruled that actual 
competition among the teams need not be demonstrated, as long as potential for competition 
exists.
144
  This is important, as the type of competition identified in Sullivan was “competition 
for the sale of ownership interests”145 which is not easy to show evidence of when the leagues 
prohibit this type of competition to varying degrees.
146
 
 Some of the language of Sullivan was reiterated under American Needle, Inc. v. National 
Football League in 2010.
147
  In American Needle, manufacturers of sportswear for various 
professional sports teams brought an antitrust suit against the NFL for granting an exclusive 
licensing agreement to a competitor.
148
  Although the case does not reference the ability of NFL 
teams to conduct public offerings, it does further establish the proposition that sports leagues and 
teams do not operate as a single enterprise and therefore are subject to antitrust law.
149
   
                                                 
143 Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1098.  “NFL member clubs compete in several ways off the field, which itself tends to show 
that the teams pursue diverse interests and thus are not a single enterprise under § 1.”  Id. at 1099. 
144 Id. at 1100. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 176 L. Ed. 2d 947 (2010). 
148 Id. 
149 Id.  This line of case law is counterbalanced by Fraser v. Major League Soccer, LLC, which was not overruled or 
discussed in the Sullivan decision.  In Fraser, the District Court in the District of Massachusetts found that Major 
League Soccer, or MLS, was a single entity and therefore could not violate antitrust law.  Fraser v. Major League 
Soccer, L.L.C., 97 F. Supp. 2d 130, 139 (D. Mass. 2000).  This finding was in regards to MLS negotiation of player 
contracts, not public offerings from teams.  Id.  Although the MLS is not currently considered a major sports league 
in the U.S., the popularity of soccer is rising in North America and the league could develop into a major league.  
However, there are two reasons why Fraser should not be very concerning to team owners.   
First, the findings of Fraser with regard to the MLS as a single entity does not affect the courts’ 
determination that the NFL is not a single entity, as evidenced by the fact that American Needle was decided four 
years after Fraser.  Second, the MLS exists as a limited liability corporation and owns all of the teams in the league, 
with the teams operating as franchises.  “[T]he central league office owned each team, maintained all league 
sponsorship and broadcasting agreements, and required that all employment agreements with players be entered 
directly with the league rather than with the individual franchises.”  Nathaniel Grow, American Needle and the 
Future of the Single Entity Defense Under Section One of the Sherman Act, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 449, 497 (2011).  As 
such, the legal analysis that the court used to determine that the MLS was a single-entity will likely not be applicable 
to the other major leagues, which are much less unified and are not operated as franchises.   
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 The NFL line of cases is so important because the NFL is the only league with a total, 
although not codified, bar to public ownership.  All of the other major sports leagues allow at 
least some opportunities for public offerings, albeit with restrictions.  Affirmative findings that 
the NFL cannot restrict public offerings would benefit legal challenges for other leagues as well. 
V. Manchester United Since the IPO 
In order to determine the short team effects
150
 of the IPO on August 10, 2012, the stock 
price of the Manchester United shares, the financial opportunities available to the team, and the 
“on the field” success of the team should be examined.  As demonstrated below, all three 
indicate that the IPO has not harmed, and even perhaps has helped, the team in the short run. 
After opening at $14, a price much lower than initially hoped for,
151
 the Manchester 
United stock rose slightly for two days before it began to fall.
152
  Traded under the stock symbol 
MANU, the press called the IPO “a disappointment.”153  By September 13, it reached its lowest 
point, at $12.00.
154
  However, since late October 2012, the MANU shares have begun to climb, 
surpassing the $17.00 mark on January 24, 2013.
155
  As a result of the late-January share price 
                                                 
150 Because the Manchester United IPO occurred so recently, long term effects cannot be effectively judged at this 
time. 
151 Smith, supra note 13.  See also Introduction, for a discussion about the pricing of the Manchester United IPO. 
152 Manchester United PLC, GOOGLE FINANCE, 
http://www.google.com/finance?q=NYSE%3AMANU&ei=T7n9UJiDJuKj0AGcrwE, (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
153 Hoium, supra note 13. 
154 Manchester United PLC, supra note 140. 
155 Id. 
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increase, Manchester United’s enterprise value156 has reached $3.3 billion, making it the most 
valuable team in the world.
157
   
 
158
  
As indicated in the graph above, the MANU stock has outperformed the S&P 500 (in red), the 
Dow Jones (in green) and the NASDAQ (in brown) since mid-December 2012.  Although the 
Manchester United stock has dropped off from its high on February 19, 2013 of $18.82,
159
 it has 
remained well above the above-mentioned benchmarks of the market.
160
  As the share price 
                                                 
156 Enterprise value is “A measure of a company's value, often used as an alternative to straightforward market 
capitalization. Enterprise value is calculated as market cap plus debt, minority interest and preferred shares, minus 
total cash and cash equivalents.”  Enterprise Value – EV, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/enterprisevalue.asp#ixzz2JJBNoHwa. 
157 Mike Ozanian, Manchester United Becomes First Team Valued At $3 Billion, FORBES, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2013/01/27/manchester-united-becomes-first-team-valued-at-3-
billion/?223.  The next most valuable team is the NFL Dallas Cowboys, at $2.1 billion.  Id. 
158 Comparing Manchester United plc with S&P 500, Down Jones Industrial Average and NASDAQ, YAHOO 
FINANCE,  
http://finance.yahoo.com/echarts?s=MANU+Interactive#symbol=manu;range=1y;compare=%5Egspc+%5Edji+%5
Eixic;indicator=volume;charttype=area;crosshair=on;ohlcvalues=0;logscale=off;source=undefined; (last visited 
March 11, 2013).  This graph measures the changes in the MANU stock from its IPO on August 10, 2012 until 
March 11, 2013, when this note was completed. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
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increases, so does investor confidence in the brand, which can affect other aspects of the sports 
franchise, such as other financial opportunities.  Although the initial downturn was certainly 
cause for concern, if the share price continues to rise, this should encourage owners of other 
sports franchises to seriously consider an IPO in the U.S. 
Manchester United has made headlines in early 2013 with news of new sponsorships in 
both China and Japan.
161
  The team signed a three-year sponsorship deal with Wahaha Group 
Co., the largest beverage producer in China, making it the official soft drinks partner in China,
162
 
a three-year deal with China Construction Bank, entitling the bank to produce official 
Manchester United credit cards in China,
163
 and a three-year deal with Kansai Paint Co. Ltd. to 
make the company the official paint partner of Manchester United.
164
  These sponsorships 
project confidence in the brand of Manchester United and argue in favor of IPO success.   
The “on the field” success of the Manchester United team has continued since the IPO as 
well.  As of March 8, 2013, Manchester United leads the English Premier League with 71 
points.
165
  With over two-thirds of the season completed,
166
 Manchester United appears poised to 
remain in the top four positions in the Premier League, which would allow them to qualify for 
the UEFA Champions League.  This is the goal of every team in the Premier League.  If the team 
remains on course, fans will be hard-pressed to find fault with the August IPO. 
                                                 
161 This is in addition to the huge jersey sponsorship deal from Chevrolet, announced days before the IPO, reported 
to be worth over $600 million.  Ben Klayman, GM signs Man United deal day after marketing executive exit, 
REUTERS, (July 31, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/31/us-gm-manu-idUSBRE86T1HE20120731.   
162 Ramy Inocencio, Manchester United teams up with first two Chinese sponsors, CNN, (Jan. 16, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/16/business/china-manchester-united-new-sponsors/. 
163 Id.  
164 Keith Weir, Manchester United broadens sponsorship palette with Japanese paint maker, REUTERS, (Jan. 18, 
2013), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/01/18/uk-soccer-manchesterunited-sponsor-idUKBRE90H0SI20130118. 
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With an increasing share price, lucrative sponsorship agreements, and impressive “on the 
field” success, there is no indication that the Manchester United IPO has in anyway hurt the 
team.  It is likely that other sports franchises may see the Manchester United IPO as having 
improved the success of the franchise.  If so, this could sway owners considering an IPO for their 
franchise in the future. 
Conclusion 
As the economy begins to recover slowly from the recent recession of 2008, things may 
never return to normal for sports teams.  Cities will likely be much more resistant to handing out 
millions of dollars for new stadiums or even repairs on older stadiums.  This may force teams to 
look within themselves in order to raise the necessary funds, leading to more sports IPOs.  
Additionally, if players’ salary demands continue to rise, teams may be forced to look beyond 
revenues to public offerings to satisfy these demands.  Finally, as the public becomes more 
conscious of debt and financial practices after the recession, North American teams might face 
legislation like that of the UEFA Financial Fair Play Rules, driving teams to IPO in order to 
balance out their debts and equities.  All of these factors will cause sports teams to look to the 
public for funds, which could lead to a rise in sports IPOs.   
Once teams decide to go public, they will choose to do so in the U.S. because of the 
JOBS Act, the dual-class voting structure and the developments in antitrust law regarding sports 
league restrictions.  It is possible that North American teams will be hesitant to wade into the 
publicly traded arena even with the JOBS Act, the dual-class voting structure and changing 
landscape of antitrust legislation.  This may require a few more foreign teams, like Manchester 
United who are not held back by league restrictions, to IPO in the U.S. and make the option look 
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more attractive to owners.  However, as long as both the JOBS Act and the dual-class voting 
structure remain in place, and some teams are willing to challenge their respective leagues in 
court, sports IPOs in the U.S. will rise in the coming years. 
